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The Evolution of ESMA and Direct Supervision: Are there Implications for EU 
Supervisory Governance?
  
 
Abstract 
 
 
The European Securities and Markets Authority (‘ESMA’) was established six years ago. It, 
and its sibling bodies for banking, and the insurance and occupational pensions, emerged 
from the ashes of the crises, and the agencies have been the topic of much discussion in 
academic scholarship from a variety of perspectives. This article provides a new situating of 
ESMA within the broader policy context. Employing empirical observations, and rooting it 
within the related literature on supervisory governance (defined, broadly, as the supervisory 
practices and enforcement measures that contribute to governing the EU’s financial set-up), it 
explores ESMA’s pro-active use of its direct supervisory and enforcement powers, and uses 
this as a launching pad for reflecting on how EU supervisory governance is evolving.  
 
Specifically, the article speculates that although ESMA is still at a relatively youthful stage 
with respect to its direct role, it is strengthening its reputation as a credible and pro-active 
supervisor, and is becoming an important driver with respect to the evolution of EU 
supervisory governance. This article suggests that, over time, and in line with arguments 
observable in the related institutional governance scholarship, ESMA’s influence and 
approach could gradually result in the greater centralisation of supervisory governance at the 
EU level. Linked to this, the article also speculates that any such shifts in this regard will 
continue to develop slowly, and over time, rather than via any seismic shift.
 
There is one 
caveat to this analysis, however; as the current EU set-up adjusts following the ‘Brexit’ 
decision, this could lead to a more interventionist agenda materialising from some quarters.  
 
Keywords: European financial regulation; European Securities and Markets Authority; 
Supervisory governance.  
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The Evolution of ESMA and Direct Supervision: Are there Implications for EU 
Supervisory Governance?
  
 
Elizabeth Howell
* 
1  Introduction 
 
The European Securities and Markets Authority (‘ESMA’) was established six years ago. It, 
and its sibling bodies for banking, and the insurance and occupational pensions, emerged 
from the ashes of the crises, and the agencies have been the topic of much discussion in 
academic scholarship from a variety of perspectives.
1
 This article provides a new situating of 
ESMA within the broader policy context. Employing empirical observations, and rooting it 
within the related literature on supervisory governance (defined, broadly, as the supervisory 
practices and enforcement measures that contribute to governing the EU’s financial set-up), it 
explores ESMA’s pro-active use of its direct supervisory and enforcement powers, and uses 
this as a launching pad for reflecting on how EU supervisory governance is evolving.  
 
Specifically, the article speculates that although ESMA is still at a relatively youthful stage 
with respect to its direct role, it is strengthening its reputation as a credible and pro-active 
supervisor, and is becoming an important driver with respect to the evolution of EU 
supervisory governance. This article suggests that, over time, and in line with arguments 
observable in the related institutional governance scholarship, ESMA’s influence and 
approach could gradually result in the greater centralisation of supervisory governance at the 
EU level.
2
 Indeed such incremental developments can be evidenced for instance, via the EU’s 
current Capital Markets Union project (‘CMU’),
 3
 which has led to proposals focused on 
                                                      
* Slaughter and May Lecturer in Corporate Law, Faculty of Law, Cambridge, and Fellow of Magdalene 
College). 
1 There is an emerging, burgeoning literature with respect to the ESAs. In particular both legal 
scholarship, and the related political economy literature examine key questions with respect to the 
development of the EU agencies; the constraints placed on them; how they operate with respect to the 
tools they have been granted. The scholarship stemming from a political economy standpoint also 
particularly examines and speculates as to which particular influences assist in shaping the EU’s 
institutional architecture. See in particular, Niamh Moloney, ‘Institutional Governance and Capital 
Markets Union: Incrementalism or a "Big Bang"?’ (2016) 13 ECFR 376; Madalina Busuioc, ‘Rule-
Making by the European Financial Supervisory Authorities: Walking a Tight Rope’ 19 European Law 
Journal 111 Pierre Schammo, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority: Lifting the Veil on the 
Allocation of Powers’ (2011) 48 CML Rev 1879. From a banking sector perspective, see Eilís Ferran, 
‘The Existential Search of the European Banking Authority’ (2016) 17 European Business 
Organization Law Review 285. From a political economy angle, see e.g. Daniel Mügge, ‘The Political 
Economy of Europeanized Financial Regulation’ (2013) 20 Journal of European Public Policy 458. For 
related analysis, especially with respect to EU regulatory governance, the current Capital Markets 
Union project, and the possible deployment of a more ‘experimentalist approach’, see Niamh Moloney, 
‘Capital Markets Union: "Ever Closer Union" for the EU Financial System?’ (2016) 41 European Law 
Review 307; Jonathan Zeitlin (ed) Extending Experimentalist Governance?: The European Union and 
Transnational Regulation (OUP 2015). 
2 Specifically, for a discussion of such overlapping incremental developments that are observable with 
respect to the shape of the overall institutional design of the EU, see in particular Moloney, 
‘Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union: Incrementalism or a "Big Bang"?’ (n 1); 
Moloney, ‘Capital Markets Union: "Ever Closer Union" for the EU Financial System?’ (n 1). 
3 This project, amongst other aims, seeks to ensure more diversified sources of finance to enable all 
types of company can tap the capital markets, see e.g. European Commission, ‘Action Plan on Building 
a Capital Markets Union’ (COM(2015) 468 final). 
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 3 
strengthening the EU’s supervisory framework (although it has also led to more emotive 
suggestions concerning the establishment of a single European capital markets supervisor).
4  
Linked to this issue, the article also speculates that any such shifts in this regard will continue 
to develop slowly, over time ‘the way it has always happened’, rather than via any seismic 
shift.
5
  There is one caveat to this analysis, however; as the current EU set-up adjusts 
following the ‘Brexit’ decision, this could lead to a more interventionist agenda materialising 
from some quarters.
6
   
 
This article acknowledges that there is a functional logic to centralising certain supervisory 
powers: ESMA is a technocrat, and oversight and enforcement of market actors with a pan-
EU reach is, in certain areas, efficient and, in principle, effective. Empirically, ESMA has 
also demonstrated its appetite and ability for engaging with its direct role; in particular it has 
been especially assertive in utilising its more constitutionally sensitive enforcement powers. 
Further, in recent reviews, ESMA has also received considerable international and political 
endorsement with respect to its new role, helping to further cement itself into its new 
position.
7
  
 
Nonetheless, there is a range of well-documented risks associated with centralising 
supervision, and to confining such powers sectorally. In particular the crises demonstrated the 
clear dangers in relying on a ‘silo-based’ approach to regulation.
8
  Specifically, such a 
strategy is unhelpful for authorities apprehending functionally equivalent risks, and creates 
the risk of regulatory arbitrage. Hence, there should be some hesitance before embarking too 
far down this avenue. Second, prudential regulators have started to express an interest in 
securities market risks to financial stability, and this could also impede ESMA cementing any 
direct claims over the capital markets.
9
  
 
Further, there are also familiar constitutional, practical, and political hurdles to additional 
shifts of power to the centre, especially with respect to systemically significant sectors. In 
particular, there are long established constitutional constraints on the delegation of powers to 
                                                      
4 Jean-Claude Juncker and others, Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union: The 'Five 
Presidents Report' (June 2015) 12. Note that the UK in particular voiced concerns about such 
controversial suggestions, see e.g. House of Lords European Union Select Committee, ‘Whatever It 
Takes’: The Five Presidents’ Report on Completing Economic and Monetary Union (13th Report of 
Session 2015–16, 12 May 2016) 42-43. 
5 Former French President Sarkozy, as quoted by Lord Pearson, UK Parliamentary Debate (Hansard, 
HL, 2 July 2009, col 328); Moloney, ‘Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union: 
Incrementalism or a "Big Bang"?’ (n 1). 
6 Niamh Moloney, ‘Financial Services, the EU, and Brexit: An Uncertain Future for the City?’ (2016) 
17 German LJ 75, 80. 
7 IMF, EU Technical Note on ESMA (IMF Country Report No. 13/69, March 2013); European 
Commission, Report on the Operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the 
European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) (COM(2014) 509 final); European Parliament, 
Review of the New European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) (Report by Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON): October 2013). 
8 FSA, ‘The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis’ (March 2009); 
Niamh Moloney, ‘EU Financial Market Regulation after the Global Financial Crisis: "More Europe" or 
More Risks?’ (2010) 47 CML Rev 1317. 
9 Niamh Moloney, ‘International Financial Governance, the EU, and Brexit: The ‘Agencification’ of 
EU Financial Governance and the Implications’ (2016) 17 EBOR 451, 464; Financial Stability Board, 
‘FSB Publishes Proposed Policy Recommendations to Address Structural Vulnerabilities from Asset 
Management Activities’ (2016)  <http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-Asset-Management-
Consultative-Document-press-release.pdf> accessed 6 January 2017. 
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EU agencies under the Meroni doctrine.
10
 Specifically, although clearly defined executive 
powers (which can be subject to strict review) can be delegated to EU agencies; discretionary 
powers that imply a wide measure of flexibility cannot. On the basis of Meroni (as well as on 
other grounds), the UK challenged ESMA’s direct powers of intervention with respect to 
short sales at the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘CJEU’), alleging that the 
powers implied that ESMA was vested with a large measure of discretion, breaching the 
limits set by Meroni.
11
 The CJEU affirmed ESMA’s direct short selling powers,
12
 and 
although it did not reject Meroni, on a liberal reading, it did ‘clip its wings’.
13
  The CJEU held 
that provided the powers were circumscribed by various conditions and criteria that limited 
ESMA’s discretion, and provided that as the powers were amenable to judicial review, then 
Meroni was complied with.
14
 Although the judgment’s reasoning was relatively case-specific, 
a liberal reading of the case perhaps help ensure ESMA is on a firmer constitutional footing.
15
  
 
Practical barriers also exist; an increase in ESMA’s workload has not been mirrored by an 
equivalent increase in its human resources and budget.
16
  A further major impediment relates 
to a lack of political will. The main reservations stem from fiscal matters; in particular, where 
it is the Member State and national taxpayer that will ‘foot the bill’ when a market actor fails, 
this reinforces arguments for retaining supervision at the national level.
17
 Nevertheless, this is 
not a static situation, and this article speculates that, when one observes the empirical facts on 
the ground, substance rather than form suggests that none of these barriers are necessarily 
insurmountable.  
 
One way or another, however, in the field of direct enforcement, ESMA’s hands are tied in a 
much more practical regard. Constitutional constraints result in ESMA only being able to 
impose relatively small sanctions within a procedural straightjacket. Without it being granted 
the ability (that a national regulator, or ESMA’s comparative relative, the US’s Securities and 
Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) has) to impose sufficiently tough sanctions on rogue market 
                                                      
10 Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority [1957 and 1958] ECR 133. 
11 Case C-270/12 United Kingdom v Council of the European Union and European Parliament 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:18. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Eilis Ferran, ‘European Banking Union: Imperfect, but It Can Work’ University of Cambridge 
Faculty of Law Research Paper No 30/2014 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2426247> accessed 6 January 2017. 
14 United Kingdom v Council of the European Union and European Parliament (n 11). 
15 On the other hand, a more restrictive view suggests that nothing has essentially changed, see Niamh 
Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 2014), 
1002-3. See also Moloney, ‘International Financial Governance, the EU, and Brexit: The 
‘Agencification’ of EU Financial Governance and the Implications’ (n 9) 461. Moloney suggests that 
there are incentives for ESMA to use its direct powers sparingly to manage litigation risk. 
16 European Commission, Report on the Operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) 
and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) (n 22) 5, 11; House of Lords European 
Union Select Committee, The Post-Crisis EU Financial Regulatory Framework: Do the Pieces Fit? 
(5th Report of Session 2014-2015, 2 February 2015) 42. 
17 Pierre Schammo, ‘EU Day-to-Day Supervision or Intervention-Based Supervision: Which Way 
Forward for the European System of Financial Supervision?’ (2012) 32 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 771, 780; Eilis Ferran, ‘Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial 
Market Supervision’ in Eddy Wymeersch, Klaus J. Hopt and Guido Ferrarini (eds), Financial 
Regulation and Supervision: A Post-Crisis Analysis (OUP 2012) (n 23) 154. As Schammo and Ferran 
observe, in the literature this is often referred to as ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’, see e.g. Dirk 
Schoenmaker and Sander Oosterloo, ‘Cross-Border Issues in European Financial Supervision’ in David 
Mayes and Geoffrey Wood (eds), The Structure of Financial Regulation (Routledge 2007). 
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offenders to act as an adequate deterrent, market participants may simply perceive ESMA, as, 
at best, a toothless enforcer. 
 
The article is structured as follows. After this introduction, section 2 contextualises the 
analysis. Section 3 then uses empirical observations with respect to three case studies: credit 
rating agencies; trade repositories; and short selling. For clarity, the first two topics concern 
the conferral of direct day-to-day supervisory responsibilities on ESMA. The third relates to 
the related, but distinct, grant of direct emergency powers of intervention on ESMA. Section 
4 considers the implications for EU financial law and supervisory governance. Section 5 
concludes. 
2 The Context  
 
All three European Supervisory Authorities (‘ESAs’) were created in January 2011, along 
with the European Systemic Risk Board (‘ESRB’) that was mandated to oversee risk in the 
financial system as a whole. In conjunction with the Member State national supervisors, the 
ESAs, and the ESRB form the European System of Financial Supervision (‘ESFS’), replacing 
the former ‘level 3’ committees. Respecting the Treaty principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, the ESFS is conceived largely as a decentralised structure and day-to-day 
supervision is intended, in the main, to be carried out at the Member State level by the 
national competent authorities (‘NCAs’) closest to the markets and institutions that they 
supervise.
18
 One exception however, concerns the oversight of credit rating agencies 
(‘CRAs’).
19
  Here, responsibility for direct day-to-day supervision has been transferred to 
ESMA.
20
 ESMA has a wide range of supervisory powers over CRAs, and can also take 
enforcement action, including the imposition of financial penalties.
21
  
 
The transfer of supervisory competence over CRAs has not been the sole exception to the 
rule, and the development of ESMA’s role as a ‘credible direct supervisor’,
22
 and as a 
fundamental component of the ESFS, is now evident in other areas of financial market 
activity. In particular, in 2012, ESMA was granted direct responsibility for the registration 
                                                      
18 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities 
and Markets Authority) [2010] OJ L331/84, recital 9; Jacques de Larosière, The High-Level Group on 
Financial Supervision in the EU: Report (2009) 47. The ESFS’s architecture is commonly referred to 
as the ‘hub and spoke’ model; rulemaking is centralised but the focus of supervision largely remains at 
the national level, European Commission, Commission Communication: European Financial 
Supervision COM(2009) 252 Final (2009) 9; Eddy Wymeersch, ‘The European Financial Supervisory 
Authorities or ESAs’ in Eddy Wymeersch, Klaus J. Hopt and Guido Ferrarini (eds), Financial 
Regulation and Supervision: A Post-Crisis Analysis (OUP 2012) 234; Carmine Di Noia and Matteo 
Gargantini, ‘Unleashing the European Securities and Markets Authority: Governance and 
Accountability after the ECJ Decision on the Short Selling Regulation (Case C-270/12)’ (2014) 15 
EBOR 1, 40. 
19 Jacques de Larosière (n 18) 19. CESR (ESMA’s predecessor) first highlighted this issue in 2004, 
CESR, Preliminary Progress Report: Which Supervisory Tools for the EU Securities Market (2004 Ref 
(04-333f)). 
20 Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 Amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies 
L145/30. See e.g. ESMA, ‘ESMA's Role in European and International Regulatory Cooperation’ 
(Chief Executive Speech, 12 June 2012) who observes that bringing CRAs under the ‘umbrella of EU 
supervision is a milestone achievement’. 
21 CRA Regulation II recitals 14, 17-18. 
22 ESMA, Strategic Orientation 2016-2020 (ESMA/2015/935) 3; European Commission, Report on the 
Operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS). See also European Court of Auditors, EU Supervision of Credit Rating Agencies –
Well Established but Not yet Fully Effective (Special Report No 22, 2015). 
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and supervision of trade repositories
 
within the EU (broadly, bodies who collect and maintain 
records of derivatives), again with such functions extending to include enforcement powers.
23
 
The gradual expansion in ESMA’s competence can also be observed in relation to short 
selling regulation. ESMA is granted direct powers of intervention in exceptional 
circumstances: it can, subject to a detailed set of procedural conditions and constraints, 
prohibit or impose conditions on the entry into a short sale (subject to a number of conditions) 
and such measures will prevail over prior actions taken by NCAs.
24
 Each of these three case 
studies clearly evidence the gradual extension to ESMA’s operational role over time, and 
each will be further elucidated upon through reflecting on the empirical facts on the ground. 
3 Three Case Studies 
 
3.1 CRAs  
 
Why is ESMA’s approach to supervising CRAs worthy of consideration?
 25
  First, regardless 
of who supervises them, the regulation and oversight of CRAs is an important issue.
 26 
 
Specifically, CRAs were close to the origin of the problems that arose with the sub-prime 
market,
27
 and as the crisis evolved, CRAs were criticised, especially for failing to reflect the 
worsening market conditions in their ratings early enough, and then for not adjusting their 
credit ratings in time following the deepening crisis.
28
 Further, despite considerable post-crisis 
efforts to stimulate competition in the industry, the market remains oligopolistic, meaning it is 
vital CRAs are subject to a tough regulatory framework that is also backed up by a robust 
sanctioning regime.
29
 Finally, as CRAs based in one country can issue ratings that have a pan-
EU reach, it makes logical sense to transfer the monitoring role to ESMA: it is more effective 
and efficient for an authority with EU-wide reach to exercise oversight.
30
   
                                                      
23 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories 
[2012] OJ L201/1, arts 55-81; Eilis Ferran, ‘Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU 
Financial Market Supervision’ (n 17)152. 
24 Council Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps 
[2012] OJ L86/1, art 28. Although beyond the scope of this paper, ESMA will also be granted further 
direct powers with respect to the sale of particular financial instruments under the MiFID II/MiFIR 
reforms (although implementation of these rules has been postponed and is now currently anticipated 
for 2018). 
25 Note that the CRA regime and the post-crisis reforms are also connected to the broader EU banking 
reforms, however the relation between CRAs and banking regulation is beyond the scope of this paper. 
26 Much has been written on CRAs. In particular, see e.g. Chris Brummer and Rachel Loko, ‘The New 
Politics of Transatlantic Credit Rating Agency Regulation’ in Tony Porter (ed), Transnational 
Financial Regulation after the Crisis (Routledge 2014); John Coffee, ‘What Went Wrong? An Initial 
Inquiry into the Causes of the 2008 Financial Crisis’ (2009) 9 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1; 
Jakob de Haan and Fabian Amtenbrink, ‘Credit Rating Agencies’ DNB Working Paper No 278/ 
January 2011 accessed 13 May 2016.  
27 European Commission, Impact Assessment Accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation on Credit 
Rating Agencies SEC(2008) 2746 7. CRAs gave favourable opinions on instruments financially 
engineered to give high confidence to investors, and investors took insufficient interest in the 
instruments’ risk characteristics, choosing to rely on a CRA’s expertise. 
28 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies L302/1, recital 10. 
29 See e.g. European Commission, ‘Report on the Credit Rating Agency Market’ (COM(2016)664) 21. 
30  European Commission, Impact Assessment for a Regulation Amending Regulation (EC) No 
1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies SEC(2010) 678 (n 46), 4; European Commission, Impact 
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Next, what are CRAs? Put simply, they are companies that assess the credit-worthiness of 
issuers and financial instruments, and CRAs can have a major impact on the markets (as 
ratings actions are carefully tracked by, amongst others, issuers, investors, borrowers, and 
governments).
31
 CRAs traditionally issued opinions on the probability of default or expected 
losses of companies and governments; however in the years leading up to the global financial 
crisis, CRAs also provided ratings for more exotic financial instruments, and CRAs were 
linked to the issues that arose surrounding the 2007 sub-prime crisis.  Some of these issues 
arose in particular from the conflicts of interest inherent within the ratings business due to 
what can be termed the ‘issuer-pays’ model. As a CRA was, generally, paid by the same 
issuer whose creditworthiness it was rating, this model created potential conflicts of interest 
for the CRA.
32
  
 
Although there is a counter-argument, in that CRAs must protect their reputation with 
investors, and balance any short-term gain from satisfying an issuer with its long-term 
reputation in the market, it is questionable whether the risk of reputational loss can actually 
act as a form of effective sanction.
33 
 Indeed, this is especially the case with the ratings of 
structured finance products during the crisis, where the fees that CRAs could obtain strongly 
impacted their assessments.
34
 In particular, the major investment banks that brought in this 
work acquired much power over the agencies: if they were dissatisfied with a rating, business 
could be moved elsewhere.
 35
 Consequently, to retain a client, the rating had to ‘satisfy’ them, 
creating the possibility of influencing the overall process.
36
  
 
In the light of this, an early round of EU reforms on CRAs was adopted in 2009: one of the 
first key EU regulatory responses. These reforms attempted to tackle the main issues that had 
become apparent during the crisis,
37
 and CRAs established in the EU became subject a 
registration requirement. Agencies also became subject to rules concerning independence and 
the avoidance of conflicts of interest; as well as provisions on rating methodology; and rules 
to increase transparency.
38
  During the eurozone sovereign debt crisis however, CRAs were 
again the subject of criticism, especially politically, with respect to the transparency and 
quality of sovereign debt ratings. In a similar vein to the political allegations levied at short 
sellers at the time, CRAs were accused of exacerbating the crisis, both through the decisions 
to downgrade various eurozone economies, and due to the more subjective nature of 
                                                                                                                                                            
Assessment for a Regulation Establishing a European Securities and Markets Authority SEC(2009) 
1235, 26. 
31  European Commission, Impact Assessment for a Regulation Amending Regulation (EC) No 
1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies SEC(2011) 1354, 6. 
32 Impact Assessment CRA I (n 27) 14-20; John Coffee (n 26) 8. 
33 Jakob de Haan and Fabian Amtenbrink (n 26) 8. 
34 Ibid 8. 
35 John Coffee (n 26) 9. 
36 Brummer and Loko (n 26) 162. 
37 It also illustrated the EU’s desire to respond to, and frame the post-crisis international G-20 led 
agenda, see Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (n 15) 648; Brummer and Loko 
(n 26).  
38 Impact Assessment CRA I (n 27). The International Organisation of Securities Commissions’ 
(‘IOSCO’) Code of Conduct for CRAs formed a basis for the first round of CRA reforms, although the 
EU rules were stricter and more specific, IOSCO, Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating 
Agencies (note that the Code was the subject of substantial revisions in 2008 in the light of the crisis, 
and most recently revised in 2015), IOSCO, Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating 
Agencies (Final Report) (2015). 
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 8 
sovereign debt ratings that led to allegations of political bias.
39
 Other weaknesses were also 
re-emphasised, including the risk of an over-reliance on ratings by market participants; and 
the domination of the three main US agencies operating globally: Standard & Poors; Fitch; 
and Moody’s.
40
 
 
CRAs are now subject to a set of three EU regulations (collectively the ‘CRA Regulation’).
41
 
In brief, the rules require CRAs to comply with rigorous rules of conduct to mitigate possible 
conflicts of interest, and to ensure the high quality and sufficient transparency of the credit 
ratings and the ratings process.
42
 There are also specific requirements in relation to CRA 
rating methodologies. Further, reflecting the influence of politicisation on the regulatory 
process, there are also detailed provisions on the approach to be taken to sovereign debt 
ratings.
43
 The reforms also introduce measures to reduce an over-reliance on credit ratings;
44
 
as well as a new civil liability regime.
45.
 From the supervisory perspective, oversight of CRAs 
is also the first exception to the rule that, by in large, day-to-day supervision should be carried 
out at the national level.  
 
Before ESMA took up the supervisory reins in July 2011, the rules provided for a type of 
‘college-type’ supervision over CRAs. This enabled all relevant NCAs to participate in 
registering and supervising a CRA, in conjunction with a coordinating function via CESR, 
ESMA’s predecessor.
46
 This rather complex supervisory framework was never considered to 
be a long-term solution for CRA oversight, however.
47
  Although it helped streamline 
supervisory cooperation and coordination, it was recognised there would be considerable 
advantages (especially factoring in the specificities and the global nature of the ratings 
industry) in having centralised EU oversight of CRAs.
48
  It is also pertinent that this transfer 
of supervisory competence to ESMA occurred relatively smoothly. Two main factors made 
this a less risky prospect for Member States: there were no major national interests at risk 
given the domination of three US agencies in the ratings business; and second, CRAs were a 
small (albeit influential) part of the financial markets, meaning the agencies were unlikely to 
require a bail-out that could risk implicating national taxpayers.
49
  
                                                      
39 Brummer and Loko (n 26) 168. Specifically, CRAs form their opinion on sovereign States based on 
a combination of both qualitative and quantitative considerations, including economic and fiscal 
history; default history; assessment of the political situation; and policy developments in a particular 
country. Such ratings are important from a credit market perspective as well as for financial stability: if 
a sovereign rating is changed, it can have a ‘cascade’ effect on other rated entities (such as banks) as 
sovereign ratings are usually a factor in the determination of other ratings. Further, during the recent 
crises, sovereign ratings also experienced high levels of volatility (both in relation to the number of 
downgrades and upgrades, as well as the frequency of ratings). 
40 Impact Assessment CRA III (n 31) 4-5; 7. 
41 CRA Regulation; CRA Regulation II; Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 Amending Regulation (EC) No 
1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies L146/1. The set of CRA reforms will be referred to as the ‘CRA 
Regulation’, although reference to an individual regulation will be made where relevant. 
42 CRA Regulation III, recital 1. 
43 CRA Regulation, art 8; art 8a. 
44 Ibid arts 5a-5c. 
45 Ibid art 35a. 
46 Ibid, recital 46, art 29; Impact Assessment CRA II, 14. 
47 CRA Regulation, recital 51; CRA Regulation II, recital 8. 
48 CRA Regulation, recital 51; Impact Assessment CRA II (n 46).  
49 Eilis Ferran, ‘Financial Supervision’ in Daniel Mügge (ed), Europe and the Governance of Global 
Finance (OUP 2014) 34; Niamh Moloney, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority and 
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3.1.1 ESMA and CRAs: Approach to Direct Supervision  
The thinking on supervision varies with the times. In particular, stances are especially shaped 
and driven by the wider economic and political climate. In the pre-crisis days, for instance, a 
more ‘principles based’, and light-touch type of model was especially in vogue in the UK; 
although, unsurprisingly this fell out of favour with the crisis, and post-crisis thinking has 
now heralded a wider, global shift towards more ‘risk-based’ supervisory models.
 50
  What is 
a risk-based approach? It has been defined as the use of systematised frameworks of 
inspection or supervision to manage regulatory or institutional risk, the focus being not on the 
potential risks that individuals or the economy face by a firm, but the risks the regulator faces 
in failing to achieve its objectives.
51
   
 
In essence, such a model requires supervisors to make choices, and to decide what types and 
levels of risk they are prepared to tolerate, and such decisions will be especially driven by the 
broader political backdrop, and the related risk to the regulator’s reputation.
52
 Consequently, 
the higher the political salience of a risk, the less the supervisor’s risk tolerance will be in that 
area.
53
 Applying this to CRA supervision, ESMA’s risk model focuses particularly on 
financial stability and probable regulatory failure, and this is firmly on a par with the broader 
post-crisis political attitudes that emphasise the prevention of financial market instability and 
systemic risk.
54
 Further, the endorsement of such a risk-based approach by ESMA may also 
be geared towards bolstering its credibility as a direct supervisor, especially if it ensures the 
continued political confidence in its ability to perform its operational roles.
55
  
 
3.1.2 An Illustration of ESMA’s Supervisory Powers in Practice: Sovereign Ratings  
In terms of the specifics, ESMA has a wide range of direct supervisory powers including the 
power to request relevant information; examine records; and conducting on-site inspections 
and investigations (individual and thematic).
56
 In practice, ESMA has conducted a number of 
such investigations, including with respect to the more politically sensitive area on the 
                                                                                                                                                            
Institutional Design for the EU Financial Market – a Tale of Two Competences: Part (2) Rules in 
Action’ (2011) 12 European Business Organization Law Review 177, 204. 
50 See e.g. Financial Stability Board, Increasing the Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI Supervision: 
Progress Report to the G20 (2012); Julia Black, ‘Regulatory Styles and Supervisory Strategies’ in 
Niamh Moloney, Eilis Ferran and Jennifer Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation 
(OUP 2015) 13.  
51 Julia Black, ‘Risk-Based Regulation: Choices, Practices, and Lessons Being Learnt’ in Risk and 
Regulatory Policy: Improvign the Governance of Risk (OECD Publishing 2010) 187-8; Black, 
‘Regulatory Styles and Supervisory Strategies’ (n 50). 
52 Black, ‘Risk-Based Regulation: Choices, Practices, and Lessons Being Learnt’ (n 51) 193. Broadly, 
it involves the regulator developing decision-making procedures in order to prioritise regulatory 
activities and utilise resources (especially relating to inspection and enforcement) based on an 
assessment of the risks a firm poses to the regulator’s objectives. 
53 Note that aside from the influence of political considerations, risk-based frameworks face other risks 
including model risk (the risk the model fails to encapsulate all relevant risks) and implementation risk 
(the risk the model is implemented inadequately), see ibid 186. 
54 ESMA, 2013 Annual Report: Credit Rating Agencies (ESMA/2014/151) 27-8. 
55 Black, ‘Risk-Based Regulation: Choices, Practices, and Lessons Being Learnt’ (n 51) 193-4. 
56 CRA Regulation II, art 23b-art 23d. ESMA’s powers are articulated in detail in line with Meroni. 
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issuance of sovereign ratings.
57
 This was carried out before the final wave of CRA 
amendments were introduced, but it nonetheless helps demonstrate ESMA’s willingness to 
tackle more politically sensitive areas on its watch,
58
 whilst also illustrating that ESMA’s risk 
tolerance will be lower in this especially politically salient sector. 
 
ESMA’s sovereign ratings report was highly critical, and identified a wide number of 
concerns and deficiencies that could compromise the independence of the process, and the 
quality of the ratings.
59
 This included, for instance, senior management involvement in rating 
activities; disclosure of upcoming actions to unauthorised third parties; significant delays in 
publishing ratings; and allocation of lead responsibilities to junior staff. Individual remedial 
action plans were set for each of the CRAs, and ESMA continued to monitor and assess their 
implementation as part of its on-going supervisory work, which subsequently also led to 
enforcement action being instigated against Fitch (further discussed in section 3.1.7 below).
60
 
Aside from the political aspects, the investigation demonstrates ESMA’s clear appetite for its 
new role; its willingness to set itself challenging targets; and its enthusiasm for engaging in 
ambitious and sensitive work. Pragmatically, such investigations also enable it to learn 
quickly about the CRA industry, and its ‘hands on’ approach to its operational responsibilities 
contributes to it strengthening its reputation as a proactive and preventive supervisor who 
intends to drive change in the industry.
61
  
 
3.1.3 ESMA and CRAs: Ex Post Enforcement  
Credible supervision of CRAs needs to be accompanied by an effective sanctioning regime. 
This is particularly true given the oligopolistic nature of the CRA industry. A sanctioning 
regime needs to, first, provide a deterrent effect to keep at bay the risk CRAs breach the rules, 
and second, once an offence has been committed, impose a strong enough sanction to compel 
a CRA to restore the situation.
62
 
 
Nonetheless, conferring ex post enforcement powers on ESMA was, understandably, a 
controversial proposition,
63
 and the Commission initially sought to retain the ability to apply 
penalties itself.
64
  Ultimately however, ESMA has been allocated a set of enforcement tools, 
                                                      
57  Other thematic investigations focused on bank rating methodologies; and the monitoring of 
structured finance ratings at four large CRAs, see e.g. ESMA, Investigation into Structured Finance 
Ratings (ESMA/2014/1524). 
58 Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (n 15) 674. 
59 ESMA, Sovereign Ratings Investigation (ESMA/2013/1775). 
60 ESMA, 2014 Annual Report on the Supervision of Credit Rating Agencies and Trade Repositories 
(ESMA/2015/280) 20. ESMA also subsequently conducted supervisory work on the compliance of the 
CRAs with the sovereign ratings disclosure requirements introduced by the CRA III Regulation.  Such 
additional measures included requesting CRAs publish sovereign ratings and related ratings outlooks 
on a Friday after the close of business of the last EU regulated market (rather than in the morning); 
clearly stating whether ratings were solicited or unsolicited; and requesting that CRAs notify a rated 
entity in advance of any public disclosure at least 24 hours before notifying the market.  
61 ESMA, 2013 Annual Report: Credit Rating Agencies (n 54). 
62 See e.g. Impact Assessment CRA II (n 46) 27. 
63 Ibid 30; House of Lords European Union Select Committee, (7th Report of Session 2010-2011, 10 
November 2010), 70-72. 
64 E.g. Impact Assessment CRA II (n 46) 30-32. As Moloney observes, the Commission Impact 
Assessment Board highlighted Meroni concerns in relation to the justification of ESMA’s supervisory 
and enforcement powers. It queried why Meroni concerns were only raised in the context of 
sanctioning powers, and not with respect to ESMA’s registration and supervision powers. The second 
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although linked to the constitutional Meroni constraints, ESMA’s discretion is especially 
restricted in this regard.
65
 In particular, there is a highly detailed procedural framework 
articulated in the CRA rules with which ESMA must comply.
66
 Although rather technical, the 
main ‘bones’ of the regime are set out relatively briefly below in order to support the 
subsequent analysis. 
 
Procedurally, where ESMA concludes there are serious indications of the possible existence 
of facts liable to constitute an infringement of the rules,
67
 a rigorous process must be 
followed. First, an independent investment officer (‘IIO’) will be appointed to investigate.
68
 
On the basis of an IIO’s findings, and having heard the person subject to the investigation,
 69
 
ESMA’s Board of Supervisors will then decide if one or more infringements have been 
committed. If so, it shall take a supervisory measure, and potentially (where the infringement 
is committed intentionally or negligently), impose a monetary penalty. Supervisory measures 
are non-financial and can include, for instance, withdrawing a CRA’s registration; requiring 
the CRA to bring the infringement to the end; and issuing a public notice.
70
 ESMA must 
notify any such decision to the CRA (as well as the NCA, the Commission, and the other 
ESAs) and has to make public the decision on its website within 10 working days from the 
date it was adopted.
71
 This includes making public that the decision can be appealed to the 
Board of Appeal of the ESAs.
72
  
 
Where the infringement has been committed intentionally or negligently,
 73
 ESMA can 
impose a fine.
74
 Bearing in mind the Meroni concerns, ESMA’s powers are especially 
restricted and are subject to a detailed and rather rigid procedural framework.
75
 The rules lay 
down minimum and maximum basic amounts depending on the infringement: for instance for 
the lowest category of infringement, sanctions range from 10,000 to 50,000 euro; and the 
highest category ranges from 500,000 to 750,000 euro (with 750,000 euro being the 
                                                                                                                                                            
report highlighted the same concerns (although it acknowledged that the justification was somewhat 
improved), European Commission, Opinion on Impact Assessment on CRA II Proposal (Ref. 
Ares(2010)108790, February 2010); European Commission, Resubmitted Opinion on Impact 
Assessment on CRA II Proposal (Ref. Ares(2010)205437, April 2010); Moloney, ‘The European 
Securities and Markets Authority and Institutional Design for the EU Financial Market – a Tale of Two 
Competences: Part (2) Rules in Action’ (n 49). 
65 Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (n 15) 674. 
66 CRA Regulation II, art 23e. 
67 Annex III lists infringements and these include: conflicts of interest, organisational or operational 
requirements, as well as obstacles to the supervisory activities, and infringements to the disclosure 
provisions. 
68 CRA Regulation II, art 23e. 
69 Ibid art 36c. Note in this regard, the Commission has published additional rules of procedure to be 
followed by ESMA, Commission Delegated Regulation 946/2012 on Rules of Procedure on Fines 
Imposed to Credit Rating Agencies by ESMA L282/23. 
70 CRA Regulation II art 23e(5); art 24(1). 
71 Ibid art 24(5). 
72 Ibid art 24(5); Regulation 1095/2010, art 60. 
73  According to art 36a(1), an infringement is intentional if ESMA finds objective factors 
demonstrating the CRA or its senior management acted deliberately to commit the infringement.  
74 CRA Regulation II art 23e(5); art 36a. 
75 Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (n 15) 675. 
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maximum basic amount that can be imposed for a first infringement).
76
 The basic amount can 
also be adjusted, if need be, taking into account aggravating or mitigating factors.
77
 There is 
also a ceiling whereby a fine is not to exceed 20 per cent of the annual turnover of the CRA in 
the preceding business year.
78
  The fines must again be publicly disclosed unless exceptional 
reasons exist.
79
 Enforcement is governed by the civil procedure rules in the Member State in 
the territory of which it is carried out, and an order can be enforced once the authenticity of 
ESMA’s decision has been verified.
80
 Enforcement can be suspended only by the CJEU, 
which can also review ESMA’s decision, and annul, reduce, or increase a fine imposed.
81
 
 
ESMA’s Board of Supervisors also has the power to impose a periodic penalty payment, 
including in order to compel a CRA to put an end to an infringement.
82
 Such payments are to 
be ‘effective and proportionate’ and are to be imposed on a daily basis until the CRA or 
relevant person complies.
83
 Notwithstanding this, the provisions also specify that the amount 
of the payment shall be three per cent of the average daily turnover (or in the case of natural 
persons, two per cent) and that a payment may not be imposed for more than six months.
84
 
Again, before a periodic penalty is imposed, the same procedural framework applies as for 
fines.
85
  The rules do not provide for criminal sanctions but ESMA can refer matters for 
criminal prosecution to the relevant national authority.
86
   
 
Although the inflexible nature of ESMA’s enforcement powers cannot be avoided due to the 
surrounding constitutional issues, the current level of sanctions that ESMA is permitted to 
impose is not proportionate to the turnover of the larger CRAs in the industry.
87
  This issue 
will be returned to when reflecting on the fines ESMA has imposed so far in practice, but it is 
pertinent here to reflect on the approach of ESMA’s overseas counterpart, the SEC. In 
particular, the SEC has never been backwards at coming forwards when imposing tough 
sanctions, including on offending CRAs. As an illustration, in October 2015, the SEC charged 
the US arm of DBRS
88
 with misrepresenting that it would monitor the ratings of residential 
mortgage-backed securities (and other complex instruments) on a monthly basis as detailed in 
its surveillance methodology.
89
 DBRS agreed to pay nearly 6 million dollars, plus a censure 
                                                      
76 CRA Regulation II, art 36a. To determine whether the basic amount of the fine should be in the 
lower, middle, or higher end of the limits, ESMA shall have regard to the CRA annual turnover in the 
previous business year. 
77 Annex IV provides that, based on mitigating or aggravating factors, adjustment coefficients will be 
applied.  
78 CRA Regulation II, art 36a(4). Further, where the CRA has benefitted from the infringement, the 
fine shall be at least equal to that financial benefit. 
79 Ibid, art 36d(1). Such exceptional reasons include where public disclosure would damage financial 
markets or cause ‘disproportionate damage’ to the parties involved. 
80 Ibid art 36d(3). 
81 Ibid art 36d(3); art 36e. 
82 Ibid art 36b. 
83 Delegated Regulation 946/2012, art 36b(2). 
84 Ibid arts 36b(3)-(4). 
85 CRA Regulation II arts 36c-e; Delegated Regulation 946/2012. 
86 CRA Regulation II art 23e(8). 
87 European Commission, ‘Report on the Credit Rating Agency Market’ (n 29) 18; IMF 18. 
88 DBRS is a CRA headquartered in Toronto, but also has offices in New York, Chicago, and London. 
89 SEC, DBRS Administrative Proceedings (Release No. 76261, October 26, 2015). 
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to settle the charges, and also agreed to retain the services of an independent consultant to 
improve its internal controls.
90
  
 
One needs to be very cautious about any ‘slap dash’ direct comparisons between the two 
supervisors (that are by no means equivalent), nonetheless this illustration does reiterate that 
ESMA’s maximum fine of 750,000 euro for a first infringement is simply too low to have any 
dissuasive effect on a large CRA. It is true that sanctions are only one instrument in ESMA’s 
enforcement toolkit,
 91
 and so in theory the requirement for ESMA to publicly disclose the 
outcome could also assist in influencing CRA behaviour for the better. Nevertheless given 
that the threat of reputational loss failed to act as a deterrent on CRAs in the past, it is 
debateable if this can offer any useful impact in this area.  
3.1.4  Enforcement Powers in Practice 
The table included below sets out a brief summary of the three CRA enforcement actions that 
have been concluded by ESMA at the time of writing. Broadly, these cases all related to a 
number of CRA internal control failures and shortcomings, including with respect to the 
retention of adequate records; inadequate compliance functions; and infringements of the 
rules concerning non-disclosure of information to unauthorised third parties. 
 
  ESMA Enforcement Action 
 
Enforcement Measures Number  Parties 
Public Notices 3 S&P (June 2014) 
DBRS (June 2015) 
Fitch Ratings (July 2016) 
Other Non-Monetary measure - - 
Fines 2 DBRS: €30,000 (June 2015) 
Fitch: €1,380,000 (July 2016) 
Periodic Payments - - 
 
 
3.1.5 First Public Notice: S&P 
The first concluded case resulted in the issue of a public notice for the first time and censured 
Standard & Poor’s Credit Market Services France SAS and Standard & Poor’s Credit Market 
Services Europe Limited (‘S&P’) for failing to meet some of the organisational requirements 
set out in the CRA rules.
92
  In brief, the case concerned S&P’s production of Banking 
Industry Country Risk Assessments (‘BICRAs’), which, according to S&P, were not credit 
ratings but an assessment of the banking systems in particular countries.
93
 Nevertheless S&P 
decided to maintain BICRAs in the same internal database as credit ratings and to display 
them on its web-based Global Credit Portal (‘GCP’) (one of the methods S&P used to 
                                                      
90 Ibid (n 89) 8-12; SEC, ‘SEC Charges Credit Rating Agency with Misrepresenting Surveillance 
Methodology’ (October 2015)  <https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-246.html> accessed 21 
July 2016. 
91 E.g. Baldwin and Black refer to there being a pyramid of sanctions ranging from ex ante supervision 
and monitoring to more intrusive enforcement mechanisms in the event of non-compliance, see e.g. 
Robert Baldwin and Julia Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 59. 
92 ESMA, 2014 Annual Report on the Supervision of Credit Rating Agencies and Trade Repositories (n 
60) 23.  
93 ESMA, Decision of the Board of Supervisors: S&P Public Notice (ESMA/2014/544) 4. 
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disseminate its financial information products). The predictable result of this was that 
BICRAs were treated as credit ratings, and no effective action was taken by S&P to address 
the implications this could have.
94
  
 
This led to the incident in the midst of the sovereign debt crisis, when an attempt to change an 
incorrect display of the BICRA for France triggered an email alert to S&P subscribers, 
erroneously informing them that S&P had downgraded its ratings of France (specifically, the 
email stated in its header, ‘France (Republic of) (Unsolicited Ratings): DOWNGRADE’).
95
 
Understandably, such an error, coming in the midst of the crisis, led to uproar in France, amid 
considerable speculation that the worsening state of France’s public finances could result in it 
losing its prized triple A status.
96
 
 
ESMA’s Board of Supervisors concluded that the incident resulted from control failures 
within S&P’s organisation; for instance there was a clear lack of responsibility for the project, 
the relevant staff appeared inadequately informed, and they did not demonstrate sufficient or 
necessary understanding as to what was taking place.
97
 There was also a lack of effective 
oversight and responsibility: in particular the person who had approved the upload of BICRA 
for France had ‘completely forgotten’ the information had been uploaded and was not aware 
BICRA was shown together with France’s sovereign rating.
98
 
 
The imposition of a non-monetary measure amounted to a cautious start by ESMA, and the 
press suggested it fell short of the tough action European politicians wished to see with 
respect to the credit rating industry.
99
 Nevertheless, from a purely legal angle, as ESMA was 
not satisfied the violation had occurred intentionally or negligently, a financial penalty was 
never going to be an option. Nevertheless, in line with ESMA’s attitude to its direct 
supervisory responsibilities, the case can still be interpreted as a signal to other CRAs that 
ESMA is also seeking to be a pro-active enforcer, as well as offering a useful case study to 
CRAs as to the types of internal control mechanisms that they should have in place.
100
  
 
On a pragmatic note, the case also serves to illustrate that enforcement action takes time. 
ESMA’s investigation commenced in November 2011, and was only concluded over two 
years later. Indeed, when one reflects on ESMA’s operational role, not only will the rigid 
procedural conditions make swift enforcement action tricky, so will the fact it has only 
relatively limited resources. To provide an illustration: in 2013 while the S&P investigation 
was progressing, out of a total of 32 CRA staff,
101
 only approximately 20 per cent of staff 
                                                      
94 Ibid 4. 
95 Ibid 3-4. According to Reuters, S&P was also criticised at the time for taking nearly two hours to 
correct the mistake, by which point the market had closed, ‘EU Watchdog Censures S&P for French 
Rating Cut Error’ Reuters (3 June 2014) <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-esma-s-p-
idUKKBN0EE0KJ20140603> accessed 18 July 2016. 
96 Sam Fleming and Hugh Carnegy, ‘S&P Censured for Erroneous France Downgrade Alert’ Financial 
Times (3 June 2014) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/326b279c-eafb-11e3-bab6-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz4EluV9HBk> accessed 19 July 2016. S&P did in fact subsequently 
downgrade France a few weeks later although the move had little effect on France’s borrowing costs. 
97 ESMA, Decision of the Board of Supervisors: S&P Public Notice (n 93) 5. 
98 Ibid 5, 7. It also observed that there was also no clear procedure for taking rapid and effective 
corrective action once the error was discovered. 
99 Sam Fleming and Hugh Carnegy, (n 96). 
100  Cheryl Jones, ‘Standard Not Poorer after ESMA Enforcement’ (June 2014)  
<http://blogs.lexisnexis.co.uk/fs/standard-not-poorer-after-esma-enforcement/> accessed 19 July 2016. 
101 This was from a headcount of 139 ESMA staff, see ESMA, Annual General Supervision Report 
(2013) 73. 
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time was engaged in day-to-day supervision and enforcement activity.
102
 Likewise out of 
ESMA’s total budget of 28.1 million euro in 2013, only 5.7 million euro (approximately 20 
per cent) was allocated to CRAs.
103
 In contrast (and, bearing in mind its different range of 
activities) in the UK, the Financial Conduct Authority’s (‘FCA’s) total budget for the same 
period was £432.1 million.
104
  With this in mind, ESMA clearly requires a bigger ‘budget 
envelope’ to function more effectively in practice.
105
  
 
3.1.6 Monetary Penalties: DBRS  
In June 2015, ESMA concluded its action against the European arm of DBRS Ratings 
Limited (‘DBRS’) that resulted in a public notice, as well as a fine, with respect to one 
infringement. The case again concerned a number of internal corporate governance and 
control failings within DBRS. There were three main infringements: first, DBRS had a 
governance structure in place whereby the board of directors, and an ‘Executive Group’ 
worked alongside each other without any delegation from the board, and without the two 
bodies having procedures in place to report to one another.
106
  
 
Next, the evidence demonstrated that DBRS’s compliance department had no formal work 
plan during the period under investigation, its records were incomplete, and no risk 
assessment activities had been carried out.
107
 Finally, DBRS had also failed to meet the 
requirements with respect to adequate records and audit trails. For example, in certain 
instances DBRS could not confirm whether, or to what extent, documents provided to ESMA 
constituted all the existing records of procedures implemented by DBRS in order to comply 
with the CRA rules.
108
 ESMA concluded that DBRS had committed this third infringement 
negligently, and imposed a fine of 30,000 euro.
109
 
 
DBRS earned the ‘dubious honour’ of being the first CRA to be the subject of a monetary 
penalty,
110
 yet the fine itself was minute; and at most, was simply a cost of DBRS doing 
                                                      
102 Aside from this, approximately 35 per cent of staff time was engaged in thematic and individual 
investigations; 25 per cent in single rulebook and international cooperation; and 10 per cent in 
registration/perimeter and risk-analysis related activities (totalling 90 per cent of staff time), ESMA, 
Report on Staffing and Resources (ESMA/2014/939) 14. 
103 ESMA, Annual General Supervision Report (n 101) 68.  Note however that ESMA did observe that 
other authorities with CRA regulatory responsibilities such as the SEC’s Office of Credit Ratings had 
similar sized teams to those at ESMA, ESMA, Report on Staffing and Resources (n 102) 14.   
104 FCA, Business Plan 2013/14 (2013) 55; Moloney, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority 
and Institutional Design for the EU Financial Market – a Tale of Two Competences: Part (2) Rules in 
Action’ (n 49) 214. 
105 IMF (n 87) 14-15 that observed ESMA’s budget envelope for 2013 was insufficient. 
106 ESMA, 2015 Annual Report on the Supervision of Credit Rating Agencies and Trade Repositories 
(ESMA/2016/234) 17; ESMA, Decision of the Board of Supervisors: DBRS Public Notice and Fine 
(ESMA/2015/1048) 5. 
107 ESMA, Decision of the Board of Supervisors: DBRS Public Notice and Fine (n 106) 7. 
108 Ibid 8-9. 
109 Ibid 9-10. 
110  ‘EU Ratings Watchdog Imposes First Fine on DBRS’ Financial Times (29 June 2015) 
<http://www.ft.com/fastft/2015/06/29/eu-ratings-watchdog-imposes-first-fine-on-dbrs/> accessed 20 
July 2016. 
Acceptance Version 
 16 
business.
111
 The small size of the sanction is especially notable when one again contrasts it 
with the recent enforcement action taken against the US arm of DBRS. Although the US 
proceedings concerned different, and more serious offences, the fine of almost 6 million 
dollars certainly had more likelihood of acting as an effective deterrent.
112
 
3.1.7 Fitch  
ESMA’s most recent action against Fitch Ratings Limited (‘Fitch) in July 2016, related to a 
set of negligent infringements, and resulted in a 1.38 million euro fine, plus the issuance of a 
public notice. The case arose from ESMA’s sovereign ratings investigation and involved 
three main issues. First, from December 2010 until June 2012, certain senior analysts at Fitch 
passed on information about forthcoming rating actions on sovereign ratings to senior persons 
in Fimalac S.A. (one of Fitch’s parent companies). In particular, there were nine separate sets 
of email exchanges with respect to actual or potential rating actions in six countries
113
 that 
infringed the requirements not to share or disclose information on new ratings with those not 
involved in their production.
114
 Next, Fitch failed to allow Slovenia the minimum period of 
time (12 hours) to consider and respond before publishing a sovereign rating, and also failed 
to provide it with the principal grounds on which the rating was based.
115
 Finally, Fitch’s 
internal controls were again affected by substantial shortcomings. For instance, the policy 
framework provided unclear guidance to staff on how to comply with the 12-hour 
requirement; those responsible for supervising compliance did not exercise their control 
function; and follow up action did not detect and adequately address such shortcomings.
116
  
 
A number of observations can be made in relation to this case. First, it demonstrates that 
ESMA’s on-going supervisory work is useful not only to improve practices and behaviour 
within CRAs, but also as a vital aid for teams in evaluating whether a CRA may be breaching 
the rules. Next, the Fitch penalty is the largest fine imposed so far by ESMA. It also reiterates 
that, despite the constitutional sensitivities, ESMA has embraced its direct responsibilities, 
and is gradually making ‘ESMA-shaped changes’
117
 within the parameters it has to operate.  
 
Nevertheless it is also again true that when one juxtaposes the size of ESMA’s penalties with 
those recently imposed by the SEC, the difference is stark. For instance the SEC announced 
charges against S&P in 2015 involving fraudulent misconduct with respect to S&P’s ratings 
                                                      
111 Note that DBRS responded to the outcome by stating that ESMA’s review related to the time it was 
starting up in Europe and adapting to the demands of a new supervisor, that it had immediately 
addressed all these issues, and was now fully compliant with the rules, ‘EU Watchdog Imposes Its First 
Fine on Rating Agency DBRS’ Reuters (29 June 2015) <http://www.reuters.com/article/eu-dbrs-fine-
idUSL5N0ZF2C320150629> accessed 20 July 2016 
112 SEC, DBRS Administrative Proceedings (n 89). 
113 Greece, France, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, see ESMA, ESMA Fines Fitch Ratings Limited €1.38 
Million: Press Release (ESMA/2016/1157). 
114 Note that although the infringements stemmed from December 2010, ESMA found breaches only 
between 1 June 2011 and June 2012 when the infringement provisions of the CRA rules entered into 
force. 
115 ESMA, ESMA Fines Fitch Ratings Limited €1.38 Million: Press Release (n 113).  
116 ESMA, Public Notice: Fitch (ESMA/2016/1159) 3-4. The overall penalty of 1.38 million was made 
up of 60,000 euro for breaching the 12 hour requirement; 825,000 euro for the internal control failings; 
and 495,000 euro for the unauthorised disclosures (aggravating factors applied to the internal control 
failings and the unauthorised disclosures). The overall penalty also reflected the fact that Fitch had 
voluntarily taken measures to ensure the infringements could not be committed again in the future. 
117 Moloney, ‘Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union: Incrementalism or a "Big Bang"?’ 
(n 1) 389. 
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of certain commercial mortgage-backed securities (‘CMBS’). In particular, in 2011 S&P had 
misrepresented that it was using one approach to rate such deals, when in fact it was using a 
different methodology in order to make its ratings less conservative.
118
  Further, after being 
frozen out of the market for rating particular CMBS, and in a bid to re-enter it, S&P published 
a false and misleading study that omitted crucial data and also claimed that its ratings could 
withstand a ‘Great Depression-style economic collapse’.
119
 To settle the SEC charges, S&P 
agreed to pay more than 58 million dollars, plus a further 19 million to settle parallel cases 
brought by the New York and Massachusetts Attorney General’s offices.
120
 S&P was also 
banned for a year from rating certain CMBS.
121
 Notably as well, the resolution of the SEC’s 
case helped pave the way for the subsequent resolution of a much larger settlement with the 
US Department of Justice, where S&P agreed to pay almost 1.4 billion dollars.
122
  
 
Undoubtedly these are serious sums of money, and some commentators have seized on this to 
argue that ESMA has been ‘timid’ in comparison, and that this represents a lack of 
willingness by ESMA to punish the agencies.
123
 This argument should be further reflected on. 
At a basic level, there is clearly an enormous chasm separating the SEC’s approach to 
enforcement action, and that of ESMA’s. Yet, despite this, one should remain mindful about 
making any straightforward comparisons. In particular, the US and the EU are two very 
different systems, and ESMA is also required to engage in any enforcement activity within a 
technical and procedural straightjacket.  
 
Next, no consensus has yet emerged in the literature as to the best way to measure 
enforcement’s intensity or effect; for instance looking at the size of a penalty imposed fails to 
account for the deterrent effect of reputational penalties.
124
 Nevertheless, as observed at the 
outset of this discussion, in the context of CRAs, given that the risk of reputational loss failed 
to act as an effective deterrent in the past, it may be questionable whether reputational 
penalties can ever offer a meaningful impact here. Moreover, even if publishing sanctions 
could assist in influencing behaviour for the better,
 125
 the three ESMA cases (especially the 
                                                      
118 ‘S&P in $77m Mortgage Securities Settlement with the SEC’ Financial Times (21 January 2015) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a5201cc-a188-11e4-bd03-00144feab7de.html#axzz4F86jBtIC> accessed 
22 July 2016. 
119  Ibid; SEC, ‘SEC Announces Charges against Standard & Poor’s for Fraudulent Ratings 
Misconduct’ (January 2015)  <https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-10.html> accessed 22 July 
2016. 
120 SEC, ‘SEC Announces Charges against Standard & Poor’s for Fraudulent Ratings Misconduct’ (n 
120). 
121 Note that the SEC has also since brought related fraud charges against Barbara Duka, a former S&P 
manager, who oversaw its CMBS ratings, and at the time of writing, this case is continuing, despite 
Duka’s attempts at halting the use of SEC in-house administrative proceedings, ‘SEC Can Resume 
Case against Ex-S&P Executive -U.S. Appeals Court’ Reuters (13 June 2016) 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/sec-duka-idUSL1N1951ZT> accessed 22 July 2016.   
122  Ed Beeson, ‘SEC's Stiff S&P Sanction Raises Curtain for DOJ Action’ (2015)  
<http://www.law360.com/articles/613620/sec-s-stiff-s-p-sanction-raises-curtain-for-doj-action> 
accessed 22 July 2016. 
123  See e.g. Daniel Cash, ‘Credit Rating Agency Regulation after the UK's European Union 
Membership Referendum’ (2016) 37 The Company Lawyer 195.  
124 John Armour, Colin Mayer and Andrea Polo, ‘Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in 
Financial Markets’ Research Paper Number 62/2010, 1 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1678028> accessed 24 September 2015; John 
Coffee, ‘Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement’ (2007) 156 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 229. 
125 See further, John Armour, Colin Mayer and Andrea Polo (n 124); Jakob de Haan and Fabian 
Amtenbrink (n 26) 8. 
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Fitch action) generated only relatively limited mainstream press coverage.
126
 What is clear 
though, is that although it is still ‘early days’ with respect to ESMA’s enforcement actions, 
the current fines available to ESMA are inadequate to be effective in the highly concentrated 
CRA industry. On the upside, this is now becoming something of a work in progress, as the 
Commission recently proposed revisions to the CRA sanctioning regime to ensure the regime 
is credible and proportionate as a deterrent.
127
 It remains to be seen, however, whether these 
changes will be sufficient to tackle the current (largely unfair) perception of ESMA as being a 
toothless enforcer. 
3.2 Case Study 2: Trade Repositories  
 
CRAs were not the sole exception to the rule that supervisory responsibilities should 
generally be orchestrated by the NCAs. Due particularly to the lack of transparency 
surrounding derivatives trading during the financial crisis, a post-crisis framework was 
introduced that required derivative trades be reported to trade repositories (‘TRs’).
128
 Such 
entities act as a type of ‘middleman’ for ESMA; rather than individual firms submitting 
reports to ESMA, the information is submitted to the TR that maintains records that can then 
be made available to regulators.
129
  Consequently, TRs are intended to play an important role 
in improving transparency, and in ensuring accurate reporting in the derivatives market.
130
 
Akin to the CRAs, transferring supervisory responsibility to ESMA was relatively 
straightforward: there were no major national TRs for countries to seek control over; and TRs 
were not perceived as a serious source of systemic risk that could trigger fiscal responsibility 
at the national level.
131
  
 
The same could not be said concerning the regulation and supervision of central 
counterparties (‘CCPs’), however.
132
 The post-crisis rules also require standardised 
derivatives transactions be cleared through such CCPs,
133
 so that rather than two parties 
concluding a derivatives transaction privately, they now have two separate contracts with a 
CCP.
 
The rules aim at promoting financial stability through reducing counterparty risk (as 
well as the enhancement of transparency). The introduction of a CCP does not eliminate 
systemic concerns, however, it only shifts this risk to the CCP, thereby potentially increasing 
                                                      
126 For instance, on a simple Internet news search, the S&P censure generated the most broadsheet 
coverage, including reports by the FT; the Telegraph; and the Financial News, as well as legal coverage 
from Pinsent Masons (via ‘Out-Law.com’). The DBRS fine was reported by Reuters, the FT, and again 
by Pinsent Masons. The recent Fitch case generated no major coverage aside from via Reuters, and the 
‘West Australian’ (a devoted FT search produced no results).  All three cases also received some 
industry specific reports (e.g. via ‘the Investment Executive’; and ‘Waters Technology’). 
127 European Commission, ‘Report on the Credit Rating Agency Market’ (n 29) 20. 
128 This framework is introduced via EMIR 2012.  
129 Finance Magnates, ‘Is ESMA’s €64,000 Fine of the DTCC the First of More to Come?’ (2016)  
<http://www.financemagnates.com/institutional-forex/bloggers/esmas-e64000-fining-dtcc-first-come-
part-1/> accessed 2 August 2016; EMIR 2012, art 81(3) sets out the range of entities to whom TRs 
must make the data available including ESMA, NCAs supervising central counterparties, and the 
NCAs supervising the trading venues of the reported contracts. 
130 ESMA, 2014 Annual Report on the Supervision of Credit Rating Agencies and Trade Repositories 
(n 60) 31. 
131 Eilis Ferran, ‘Financial Supervision’ (n 49) 34. 
132 CCPs provide clearing and settlement services and ensure financial instruments and/or money are 
available to settle the trade, EMIR 2012, art 2(3). 
133 Ibid art 4. This was in line with G20 commitments to improve oversight and transparency in OTC 
derivatives trading following the crisis, G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit (September 
2009). 
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systemic risk in the CCPs themselves.
134
  Although the rules seeks to tackle this via a set of 
risk management and prudential provisions,
135
 in the event a CCP fails, fiscal responsibility 
will lie primarily with the Member State.
136
 Consequently, it follows that it is largely the 
NCAs (albeit via a complex college cooperation set-up), rather than ESMA, that remain 
responsible for authorising and supervising CCPs established in the EU.
137
   
 
Indeed, on a related point, although ESMA was allocated a type of ‘gatekeeper’ role in 
relation to granting access to the EU for third country CCPs,
138
 EMIR’s early drafts had in 
fact proposed that third country CCPs obtain authorisation from each individual country 
where it wished to provide clearing services.
139
 It was only the result of much lobbying by 
industry groups (who argued that such an approach could result in discrepancies between 
countries and could create barriers to trade) that responsibility for third country CCPs was 
eventually transferred to ESMA.
140
  
3.2.1 Enforcement Action: DTCC 
ESMA’s general supervisory and enforcement powers mirror the CRA template and ESMA 
has, to date, completed one enforcement action against a TR, DTCC Derivatives Repository 
Limited (‘DTCC’) that resulted in a public notice and a 64,000 euro fine. DTCC provides 
post-trading services to the global financial services industry,
141
 and is the largest EU 
registered TR. In May 2014, ESMA’s supervisory team became aware of delays in DTCC 
providing regulators with access to data. ESMA found that for approximately nine months 
during 2014, access delays were experienced that increased from two days to as much as 62 
days after reporting, affecting 26 billion reports.
142
 These delays were due to DTCC’s 
negligence in failing to put in place data processing systems capable of providing regulators 
with direct and immediate access to the data. Further, once DTCC became aware of the issue, 
it failed to inform ESMA in a timely manner; and then took three months to establish an 
                                                      
134 This means a CCP default could detrimentally affect its participants, other CCPs and also 
potentially destabilise the market, see ESMA, Recovery and Resolution of CCPs: Let’s Bring the 
Lifeboats in Place (ESMA/2016/1002) 2. 
135 EMIR 2012 arts 14-54; Linklaters, Guide to the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) 
(2014). 
136 EMIR 2012, recital 52; art 22; Eilis Ferran, ‘Financial Supervision’ (n 49) 34. See further also 
ESMA, Recovery and Resolution of CCPs: Let’s Bring the Lifeboats in Place (n 134) with respect to 
the Commission’s 2012 proposal to in relation to establishing a framework for CCP resolution.  
137 Niamh Moloney, ‘Resetting the Location of Regulatory and Supervisory Control over EU Financial 
Markets: Lessons from Five Years On’ (2013) 62 ICLQ 955, 965; Moloney, EU Securities and 
Financial Markets Regulation (n 15) 618; EMIR 2012, art 18. 
138 EMIR 2012, art 25; Eilis Ferran, ‘Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial 
Market Supervision’ (n 23) 152. Such third country CCPs can apply to ESMA for authorisation to 
provide clearing services within the EU. 
139  Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation 618; Herbert Smith, EMIR: EU 
Regulation of OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories (March 2012) 3. 
140 Herbert Smith (n 139) 3. See EMIR 2012, art 25 for the range of conditions that must be met. Note 
that for an overview of ESMA’s advice to the Commission on the equivalence of third countries in 
relation to CCPs and TRs, see Clifford Chance, ESMA Advises European Commission on Equivalence 
of Non-EU Clearing and Derivatives Rules (October 2013). 
141 ESMA, Decision Notice – DTCC Derivatives Repository Limited (ESMA/2016/408) 3.  
142 ESMA, ESMA Fines DTCC Derivatives Repository Limited €64,000 for Data Access Failures: 
Press Release (ESMA/2016/468). 
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effective remedial action plan, even when the delays worsened.
143
  ESMA concluded that 
DTCC was negligent in each respect, and the fine also represented aggravating factors (the 
infringement had continued for more than six months, it revealed systemic weaknesses in the 
organisation of the TR, and had a negative impact on the quality of TR data maintained by 
DTCC).
144
  
 
This action is notable, first, for being ESMA’s first enforcement case against a TR. The fine 
imposed was a relatively modest one, especially when one factors in the nature of the 
aggravating factors, although in this instance, the press coverage (despite being, again, 
relatively limited) suggested that the outcome would have been ‘embarrassing for one of the 
world’s most important market infrastructure organisations’.
145
  This in itself may hint at the 
possibility that reputational sanctions could play more of a role in this, and other, market 
sectors, although it is still early days, and this could also depend on the sufficiency of the 
coverage. More generally though, and firmly in line with ESMA’s approach to CRA 
enforcement work, the case articulates that ESMA has fully engaged with this extension to its 
direct powers. 
  
3.3 Case Study Three: Short Selling 
 
Although the third case study does not reflect the conferral of further day-to-day direct 
powers on ESMA, it remains a pertinent on to reflect on. Why? It is interwoven with the 
bigger picture concerning the incremental shifts observable in transferring direct operational 
powers on ESMA over time. What is short selling? In brief, the practice concerns the sale of 
an asset (often shares) not owned by a seller with the aim of buying back an identical asset 
later for a lower price, and the practice is now the subject of a range of restrictions and 
requirements under the EU Short Selling Regulation (‘SSR’).
146
  
 
Focusing only on ESMA’s direct powers, the authority is granted direct powers to intervene 
in the markets to prohibit or impose conditions on short sales in exceptional circumstances, 
and any such measure prevails over previous measures taken by NCAs.
147
 There is one 
caveat, however: sovereign debt is excluded from its ambit due to political concerns as to the 
possible effects on countries’ borrowing costs.
148
 In line with its CRA, and TR direct powers, 
ESMA can only utilise these direct powers in exceptional, tightly specified circumstances,
149
 
and must follow a number of procedural steps, including prior consultation with the ESRB, 
                                                      
143 Ibid; ESMA, Decision Notice – DTCC Derivatives Repository Limited (n 141) 6. 
144 ESMA, Decision Notice – DTCC Derivatives Repository Limited (n 141) 7. 
145 ‘EU Watchdog Fines DTCC for Derivatives Repository Failings’ Reuters (31 March 2016) 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/eu-derivatives-regulator-idUSL5N173206> accessed 3 August 2016. 
Again, using a simple Internet news search, Reuters, and the Financial News provided the main 
coverage. There was no FT coverage of this fine. 
146 For further discussion see e.g. Elizabeth Howell, ‘Short Selling Restrictions in the EU and the US: 
A Comparative Analysis’ (2016) 16 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 333; Moloney, EU Securities 
and Financial Markets Regulation (n 15) 538; Jennifer Payne, ‘The Regulation of Short Selling and Its 
Reform in Europe’ (2012) 13 EBOR 413. 
147 Regulation 236/2012 art 28(11). 
148 Ibid, art 28. 
149 Broadly, where there is a threat to the orderly functioning of markets or the stability of the financial 
system, there are cross-border implications, and NCAs have either not taken action, or the measures 
taken do not adequately address the threat. Ibid art 28. 
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prior notifications to NCAs affected by any such measure, and publication of the measure on 
its website.
150
 
 
The ability for ESMA to directly intervene in the markets in emergencies places the agency at 
the heart of important and delicate decisions with respect to short selling. It also constitutes 
another significant step forward in relation to the ability for ESMA to intervene directly in the 
markets. In this regard it is worth reiterating that although the UK sought to legally challenge 
the conferral of these powers on ESMA, the CJEU affirmed the powers, as well as the legal 
basis on which they were adopted.
151
 
3.3.1 ESMA’s Powers in Practice 
ESMA has not yet utilised its direct powers of intervention, and so it remains to be seen what 
use it makes of this new competence. In related developments, however, following the Brexit 
vote of June 2016, ESMA’s chairman confirmed that ESMA and the NCAs had coordinated 
in advance and had decided there was no need to use their powers on the day of the result, 
including in relation to imposing short selling bans.
152
   
 
Linked to this, ESMA has also issued a number of opinions over the years concerning the 
imposition of NCA emergency bans, and an important shift is discernable here. In the main, 
ESMA has generally been supportive of such measures, yet its early opinions were notably 
brief, and tended to closely map the SSR’s wording.
153
  Over time, however, ESMA has 
started to provide far more detailed and comprehensive opinions,
154
 and notably ESMA also 
recently issued one negative opinion on a NCA’s emergency measure. Specifically, in 
January 2016, it published a relatively detailed negative opinion opposing the proposed 
extension of an emergency short selling ban by Greece, relating to the shares of Attica Bank 
S.A. (‘Attica’). ESMA considered that the threat to financial stability of Attica, and the Greek 
financial market, had considerably decreased, and took the view that renewing the measure 
was neither appropriate nor proportionate.
155
   
 
This was the first time ESMA had opposed a NCA’s proposed emergency measure, and its 
opinion was comprehensive, providing quantitative analysis of Attica’s share price to 
illustrate that its pricing history did not suggest a highly fragile situation, and, also observing 
                                                      
150 Ibid art 28(4)-(5); art 28(7). 
151 For a comprehensive discussion of this case see e.g. Carl Fredrik Bergström, ‘Shaping the New 
System for Delegation of Powers to EU Agencies: United Kingdom v. European Parliament and 
Council (Short Selling)’ (2015) 52 CML Rev 219; Elizabeth Howell, ‘The European Court of Justice: 
Selling Us Short?’ (2014) 11 ECFR 454. 
152 Indeed, although in the immediate aftermath of the referendum, financial institutions such as Lloyds 
and Societe Generale had approximately one fifth wiped off their share value, ESMA (as well as the 
head of equities at the London Stock Exchange) took the view that the market infrastructure had coped 
well with the impact and there was no need to introduce any extraordinary measures, see Huw Jones, 
‘Market Infrastructure Coped Well with Brexit Fallout: EU Watchdog’ Reuters (29 June 2016). 
153 For instance, one of the first opinions issued in relation to emergency measures imposed by the 
Spanish regulator in 2012 contained a brief factual background before simply stating that there were 
adverse developments; that the measure was appropriate and proportionate, and that the measure’s 
duration was justified. See e.g. ESMA, Opinion on Spanish Emergency Measures (ESMA/2012/715); 
see also ESMA, Opinion on Greek Emergency Measures (ESMA/2013/542). 
154 This included for instance its nuanced review on a three-month emergency ban imposed by the 
Italian regulator, CONSOB, in July 2016 on Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena’s (‘BMPS’) shares 
ESMA, Opinion on Italian Emergency Measures (ESMA/2016/1078).  
155 ESMA, Opinion on Greek Emergency Measures (ESMA/2016/28). 
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that Attica stood for only a very small part of the Greek banking sector with respect to 
financial stability concerns.
156
  ESMA also identified a number of other tools under the SSR 
that could be more appropriate if a significant downward spiral in the share price was to 
occur.
157
 
 
The Greek regulator proceeded to implement its ban regardless, although it is probable that 
the reigniting of the Greek crisis in 2015, the broader political landscape, and the fragility of 
Greek relations within the EU all played a part in this decision. Nonetheless the instance 
remains significant for ESMA’s opposition. In particular it reflects a strengthening of 
ESMA’s capacity as a supervisor, especially in its willingness to adopt an opposing position 
that directly criticises the stance of a national authority.
158
  With an eye to the future, it is also 
likely that this will not be the only occasion when a NCA and ESMA disagree on whether an 
emergency measure should be introduced. Consequently, in the event there are differences of 
opinion (and although the Brexit ESMA/NCA interaction arguably augurs well for the 
future), the Greek negative opinion reflects ESMA gaining further confidence in its ability to 
assert itself as an authority. The question therefore remains open as to whether this could 
result in ESMA fully embracing its direct powers of intervention in a future crisis, especially 
in the absence of any NCA cooperation. 
4 ESMA: Implications for EU Financial Law and Supervisory Governance 
 
4.1 ESMA’s Credibility: Recent Reviews 
 
The arguments geared towards transferring direct responsibility to ESMA over market actors, 
practices and activities are evident in each of the cases explored in section 3: direct oversight 
should ensure that there is greater consistency in applying the rules; as well as enabling more 
effective and efficient supervision.
159
 Indeed, particularly where actors or practices have pan-
EU reach, there is considerable sense to centralising certain supervisory powers to a EU 
agency such as ESMA. Such (mainly) positive verdicts also come through in a number of 
recent reviews on ESMA and these assist in bolstering ESMA’s credibility both politically 
and internationally.  
 
Although perhaps not an impartial review, in 2013, the founding father of the ESAs, Jacques 
de Larosière commented that ESMA had performed well and become a recognised 
international authority.
160
  Likewise, the Commission’s first ‘stocktake’ of the ESAs in 2014, 
observed that there was broad consensus as to the efficiency and effectiveness of ESMA’s 
direct supervision of the CRAs, as well as its mandate for supervising TRs.
161
 It also indicated 
that further tasks could be potentially assigned to ESMA in the future including (but not 
limited to) international financial reporting standards enforcement, the direct supervision of 
                                                      
156 Ibid 6. 
157 Ibid 7. 
158 Moloney, ‘Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union: Incrementalism or a "Big Bang"?’ 
(n 1) 418. 
159 Eilis Ferran, ‘Financial Supervision’ (n 49) 35. 
160 Jacques de Larosière, ‘The European System of Financial Supervision’ (Speech: Public hearing on 
Financial Supervision in the EU (May 2013)) 12. 
161 European Commission, Report on the Operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) 
and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) (n 22) 11. 
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critical and highly integrated market infrastructures such as CCPs, and the strengthening of 
ESMA’s direct settlement powers.
162
 
 
With respect to ESMA’s supervision over CRAs, a slightly more equivocal report by the 
European Court of Auditors (‘ECA’) concluded that ESMA had laid down good foundations 
for effective supervision and that the regime was well established.
163
 It also set out a number 
of areas where there was room for improvement, however. For instance, the report suggested 
that ESMA’s lack of a documentation trail made it hard to understand why certain risks were 
reprioritised. Perhaps rather ironically given ESMA’s own CRA enforcement work, the 
report’s recommendations mainly relate to ESMA improving its record keeping and decision-
making processes, but ESMA, in the main, accepted the suggestions.
 164
  Finally, the 
Commission’s recent 2016 report on the CRA industry also concluded that the CRA rules 
granted the authorities the necessary tools to supervise CRAs, but emphasised that the 
sanctioning regime required revision to ensure it was credible and proportionate as a 
deterrent.
165
 
 
More generally, ESMA is maintaining a relatively ambivalent stance about the evolving 
nature of its direct role. On the one hand it announced that it had merged its supervision of 
CRAs and TRs into a single ‘Supervision Department’ at the end of 2015 to strengthen its 
role as a direct supervisor.
166
  On the other, in its 2016-20 Strategic Orientation, it stated that 
although it anticipated that its focus would shift more towards supervision and supervisory 
convergence, it was not asking for new areas of direct supervision, but stood ready to assume 
new tasks, should these be assigned, along with the appropriate resources.
167
  
 
4.2 ESMA’s Direct Role: Risks and Obstacles 
 
At this stage it is evident that ESMA has succeeded in quickly establishing itself a relatively 
well-functioning and efficient direct supervisor that has performed well against a broad range 
of operational tasks.
168
 It is also apparent, however, that there is a set of stumbling blocks to 
ESMA fully achieving its current mandate, or to taking on further direct responsibilities. The 
first relates to the current institutional approach that continues to tackle the conferral of 
powers sectorally. This approach can be questioned, especially given the recent evidence 
                                                      
162 Ibid 13-14. Other areas identified for ESMA included the supervision of critical benchmarks in 
financial instruments and contracts; and with respect to central securities depositaries (‘CSDs’), see 
European Commission, Staff Working Document Accompanying the Commission ESA Report 
(SWD(2014) 261 final) 26. 
163 NB the report covers the period till September 2015 but was not published until 1 February 2016. 
164 European Court of Auditors (n 22). ESMA only partially accepted some recommendations however; 
for instance ESMA did not consider that a dedicated IT system was necessary given the limited number 
of registered CRAs. It also suggested that the direct comparison with NCAs was not proportionate in 
light of the numbers of registered CRAs and the size of ESMA’s supervisory team compared with the 
NCAs’ respective figures. See also, Council of the European Union, Economic and Financial Affairs: 
Outcome of the Council Meeting (9342/16 25 May 2016) 15. 
165 European Commission, ‘Report on the Credit Rating Agency Market’ (n 29) 20. 
166 ESMA, 2015 Annual Report on the Supervision of Credit Rating Agencies and Trade Repositories 
(n 106) 40. With this one unit, ESMA intends to build on its expertise in each area, and to employ a 
wide range of supervisory mechanisms to achieve its objectives, and to change industry practices, 
where required. 
167 ESMA, Strategic Orientation 2016-2020 (n 22) 16.  
168 European Commission, Report on the Operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) 
and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) (n 22) 12. 
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from the crises. Such a strategy does not tackle functionally similar risk, and creates risks of 
regulatory arbitrage.
169
  Indeed, on a related point, it is notable that prudential regulators are 
now starting to express an interest in risks to financial stability that could be posed by the 
capital markets. For instance, there is currently a fairly heated discussion as to the risks that 
could be posed by asset management activities.
170
 Regardless of the rights and wrongs of 
these precise proposals, there is certainly much sense in prudential regulators surveying all 
potential threats to financial stability, yet from ESMA’s perspective, this could ultimately also 
create a threat to its claim as the EU’s securities and markets supervisor.
171
 
 
Next, ESMA’s ability to perform its current activities is hampered by its limited human 
resources and budget. 172 Indeed although ESMA’s budget has increased since its creation, its 
funding arrangements are not proportionate to its increasing workload and duties.
173
  With this 
in mind, unless the resources available to ESMA are increased considerably, it will remain 
limited in its ability to effectively achieve its current objectives, and will slow down the 
likelihood of any further transfers of supervisory power.
174
  
 
ESMA’s precise funding set-up is also relevant. All three ESAs are funded via a subsidy from 
the EU, as well as contributions from the NCAs, however ESMA is also partially funded via 
annual fees that are levied on the CRAs and TRs.
175
 The funding received from the EU and 
NCAs is far from ideal, however: for instance, concerns have been raised that ESMA’s 
independence could be undermined by the role of both the NCAs and the Commission in 
                                                      
169 Moloney, ‘EU Financial Market Regulation after the Global Financial Crisis: "More Europe" or 
More Risks?’ (n 8) 1360. 
170 See e.g. Caroline Binham et al, ‘FSB Proposes Stress Testing for Asset Managers’ Financial Times 
(22 June 2016) <https://www.ft.com/content/5b60ba04-387e-11e6-a780-b48ed7b6126f> accessed 6 
January 2017; Moloney, ‘International Financial Governance, the EU, and Brexit: The ‘Agencification’ 
of EU Financial Governance and the Implications’ (n 9). 
171 Moloney, ‘International Financial Governance, the EU, and Brexit: The ‘Agencification’ of EU 
Financial Governance and the Implications’ (n 9) 464; Moloney, ‘Institutional Governance and Capital 
Markets Union: Incrementalism or a "Big Bang"?’ (n 1) 394; Financial Stability Board, ‘FSB Publishes 
Proposed Policy Recommendations to Address Structural Vulnerabilities from Asset Management 
Activities’ (n 9). 
172 For instance (and, again, although the comparison with the FCA is not perfect given that their 
functions are not identical), in 2015, the UK’s FCA had a budget of nearly £500 million and over 3000 
staff. In contrast, ESMA had a budget of €34 million and a staff of 186. Figures drawn from ESMA 
and the FCA’s 2015 annual reports, see ESMA, Annual General Supervision Report for 2015 (2015) 
64; FCA, Annual Report and Accounts 2015/16 (2016) 9. 
173 European Commission, Report on the Operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) 
and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) (n 22) 11. See also e.g. Jacques de 
Larosière, ‘The European System of Financial Supervision’ (n 160); IMF (n 87) that expressed the 
view that ESMA’s work plan should be implemented with additional resources. 
174  Eilis Ferran, ‘Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market 
Supervision’ (n 23) 137. It is also acknowledged that simple increases in staff and budget may fail to 
achieve significant change if staff are under-motivated and under-paid, Niamh Moloney, ‘Supervision 
in the Wake of the Financial Crisis’ in Eddy Wymeersch, Klaus J. Hopt and Guido Ferrarini (eds), 
Financial Regulation and Supervision: A Post-Crisis Analysis (OUP 2012) 87. See also Howard 
Jackson and Mark Roe, ‘Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based 
Evidence’ (2009) 93 Journal of Financial Economics 207. 
175 Note that its funding sources now also include an additional NCA contribution towards delegated 
tasks. In 2015, ESMA was financed 40 per cent by NCAs; 26 per cent by the EU; 21 per cent by the 
CRAs; 6 per cent by TRs; and 7 per cent by an NCA contribution for delegated tasks, see ESMA, 
Annual General Supervision Report for 2015 (n 172) 64. 
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financing them.
176
  Second, as ESMA grows, the contribution from NCAs could become a 
heavy burden for smaller Member States, creating a risk of non-payment.
177
  Again, this issue 
may be now a work in progress as the Commission is mindful of such concerns, and has 
recommended that further analysis be carried out in relation to improving the funding 
structures for all the ESAs, including with respect to increasing the level of industry fees 
funding.
178
  However, it is also clear that there are risks with expanding such a model, 
including risks as to ‘double charges’, where market actors could be funding both its own 
NCA and ESMA. Further, even if the domestic fee could be offset, this could then risk 
negatively impacting the operation of the relevant NCA.
179
 Nevertheless, as the NCA and 
ESMA functions are not technically identical, perhaps it could be feasible to implement a 
type of dual system going forward.
180
  
 
A further significant hurdle stems from fiscal concerns. In particular, as already observed, 
when a market actor fails, and domestic taxpayers’ money is at risk, the adage ‘he who pays 
the piper, calls the tune’ applies, and supervisory competence remains at the domestic level.
181
 
Whereas the CRAs, and TRs were never likely to be a source of fiscal risk for Member States, 
this constraint is likely to present one of the main stumbling blocks to the Commission’s 
proposal that direct competence could be transferred to ESMA over CCPs. Indeed, such fiscal 
concerns were also behind the exclusion of sovereign debt from ESMA’s direct intervention 
powers with respect to short selling.  
 
Closely interwoven with this issue, however, is the prevailing political climate. With respect 
to the EU’s current CMU project, the recent ‘Five Presidents Report’
182
 commented on the 
need to strengthen the EU’s supervisory framework to ensure financial stability. Notably, 
however, this report also contained much more contentious hints, including that such moves 
should ultimately lead to the creation of a single European capital markets supervisor.
183
 This 
                                                      
176 European Commission, Staff Working Document Accompanying the Commission ESA Report (n 
162) 20. 
177 See IMF (n 87) 11. 
178 Ibid 11; European Commission, Report on the Operation of the European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) (n 22) 11; European Commission, 
Staff Working Document Accompanying the Commission ESA Report (n 162) 20. See also ESMA, 
Strategic Orientation 2016-2020 (n 22) 17 where the President of the Commission has requested there 
be a focus on eliminating EU and NCA budgetary contributions and that the ESAs be solely funded by 
the sectors they supervise. 
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article speculates, however, that no such dramatic developments are likely in the near future 
(absent another global crisis). The EU is not at the stage of creating a ‘EU-SEC’. Rather, it is 
more probable that ESMA’s direct powers and influence will continue to increase over time 
and that ESMA will continue to be an important driver in shaping how EU supervisory 
governance evolves. Indeed, in line with arguments put forward in the related institutional 
governance literature,
 184
 all such shifts may gradually then lead to a greater enhancement of 
ESMA’s direct powers, despite the various hurdles that have been identified. How such 
developments could be affected by the current shake-up of the EU caused by Brexit is 
impossible to predict, however. At this stage, the most that can be said with any certainty is 
that it may reinforce some Member State leanings towards an increased centralisation of 
powers, including with respect to greater supervisory integration.
185
 Finally, the one factor 
that may still truly hinder ESMA in practice is the tools it has in its enforcement kit. Without 
the ability to impose severe penalties on dominant CRA players, it will struggle to have any 
dissuasive impact in practice. 
5. Conclusion 
 
ESMA has seized the day with its new role as a direct supervisor. It has set to work 
immediately in carrying out its supervisory and enforcement responsibilities, and has shown 
itself to be a pro-active patroller of the markets that is also able to engage with more 
politically delicate aspects on its watch. ESMA has acknowledged that it is still at a relatively 
early development stage with respect to its direct responsibilities, but it is building up a 
reputation as a credible watchdog that has also been endorsed both politically and 
internationally.
186
  
 
This article speculates that ESMA is strengthening its influence over time (with a notable 
recent instance being its negative short selling opinion). The article suggests that ESMA is 
likely to continue to be a significant driver in shaping EU supervisory governance going 
forward and that this could likely result in the greater centralisation of supervisory powers, 
over time. Despite the change in the air following the Brexit decision, this article suggests 
that any such supervisory governance shifts will continue to progress in a somewhat 
unspectacular fashion, but when one bears in mind the facts on the ground, the article 
speculates that ESMA remains in a prime position to play a major influence going forward. 
Although the article has also sought to document that there are still a wide range of formal 
obstacles and risks, it speculates that there may be in fact few real constraints given the 
empirical evidence observable in practice. 
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